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Abstract
The challenge of stateless-receiver broadcast encryption lies in minimizing storage and the num-
ber of encryptions while maintaining system security. Tree-based key distribution schemes offer the
best known trade-off between the two parameters. Examples include the complete subtree scheme
[D. Wallner, et al., Internet draft, http://www.ietf.org/ID.html [10]; C.K. Wong, et al., in: Proc. SIG-
COMM, 1998, pp. 68–79 [11]], the subset difference scheme [D. Naor, et al., in: CRYPTO 2001,
Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 2139, 2001, pp. 41–62 [7]], and the layered subset difference
scheme [D. Halevy, A. Shamir, in: CRYPTO 2002, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 2442, 2002,
pp. 47–60 [5]]. We introduce generating functions for this family of schemes, which lead to analysis
of the mean number of encryptions over all privileged sets of users. We also derive the mean number
of encryptions when the number of privileged users is fixed. We expect that the techniques introduced
as well as the results in this work will find applications in related areas.
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Broadcast encryption addresses the problem of securely distributing data to a se-
lected subset of privileged users [1,3,4,6–8,10,11]. Applications include pay-TV, satellite
communications, real-time information update and media content protection. The most
interesting and the most difficult application is stateless receivers where keys cannot be
updated once distributed and each privileged user should decrypt the broadcast by himself
[4,5,7]. In addition, even a coalition of all revoked (or excluded) users should not be able
to decrypt the broadcast. In other words, after the center distributes a unique combination
of keys to each user, each message should be decrypted solely based on the initial configu-
ration. Therefore, keys must be distributed in such a way that no revoked user (or excluded
user) has a decryption key and every privileged user has at least one decryption key. Since
the selected subset of privileged users can be arbitrary and dynamically changing, the chal-
lenge lies in minimizing the user storage and the number of encryptions while maintaining
system security.
An important group of key distribution schemes uses a binary tree structure to meet the
above restrictions. This group includes the complete subtree scheme (CST) [10,11], the
subset difference (SD) scheme [7] and the layered subset difference (LSD) scheme [5].
These schemes offer the best known trade-offs between storage and communication by a
sophisticated selection of keys. Especially, the SD and the LSD schemes reduce the user
storage significantly while the number of resulting encryptions remains approximately
linear in the number of revoked users. The mean number of encryptions is an important
parameter but the exact value was not known previously. It was studied and estimated by
simulation and a tight bound was found in [5] and [7].
This work confirms the approximations and bounds of [5] and [7] by finding exact ex-
pressions for the quantities of interest. We introduce generating functions for tree-based
key distribution schemes. Analysis of these generating functions naturally leads to the ex-
act expression for the mean number of encryptions. We show that analysis for a single
privileged user can be extended to that for multiple-privileged users. We derive simple
yet accurate approximations for the mean number of encryptions. It is also expected that
the techniques introduced here will find applications in further developments in this and
related areas.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review tree-based key distribution
schemes. In Section 3, we introduce recursive techniques and obtain generating functions
for the tree-based schemes. In Section 4, we derive the exact expressions for the mean
number of encryptions over all privileged sets. In Section 5, we derive the mean number
of encryptions for a collection of privileged users of a fixed size. In Section 6, we present
approximations for the mean number of encryptions and compare our approximations with
those in [5] and [7]. Finally, we conclude in Section 7. We use N = 2n to denote the total
number of users in the system.
2. Tree-based key distribution schemes
Let the key cover of a particular key be the set of all users who hold the key and the
cover size be the size of the key cover. A cover size is valid if there exists a key with
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acterizes “usefulness” of each key numerically. In this section, we review tree-based key
distribution schemes and observe the relationship between distinct key covers and cover
sizes, which will be used in later sections.
2.1. The complete subtree scheme (CST)
The CST key distribution scheme was devised independently in [10] and [11]. Every
user is represented as a unique leaf node in a balanced binary tree. In this key tree, every
node is assigned a key and each user holds keys which are on the path from its leaf node to
the root node. Clearly, there are 2N −1 keys for N users in the system, and each user holds
log(N) + 1 keys. A single user can be revoked with log(N) encryptions. If r users are to
be revoked, none of the keys which are held by these users can be used. Therefore, after
eliminating these keys, the key tree is divided into at most r subtrees, each with O(N/r)
leaf nodes. Therefore, in the worst case, O(r log(N/r)) encryptions are necessary for N−r
privileged users. We note the following simple observations (i is an integer, 0 i  n):
1. The binary tree for N users has 2N − 1 nodes. It consists of
(a) the root node;
(b) the left subtree, which is rooted at the left child of the root node; and
(c) the right subtree, which is rooted at the right child of the root node.
Note that the left subtree and the right subtree have no node in common. Since each
node represents a key, the set of keys for N users consists of
(a) the key which corresponds to the root node;
(b) the union of the two disjoint sets of keys, each set representing keys in the half
subtree.
Therefore, the root key can be thought as a “new key” introduced as the number of
users doubles.
2. Valid cover sizes are 2i . There are exactly n+ 1 distinct cover sizes.
3. There are exactly 2n−i keys of the cover size 2i .
4. Each user holds exactly one key of the cover size 2i .
5. Let i < j  n. For any key A of the cover size 2i , there exists exactly one key B of the
cover size 2j for a particular j , such that the key cover of A is a proper subset of the
key cover of B .
2.2. The subset difference scheme (SD)
The SD key distribution was introduced by Naor, Naor and Lotspiech [7].
Just as in the CST scheme, every user is represented as a unique leaf node in a balanced
binary tree. Instead of assigning a key to every node, the SD scheme assigns a key to every
subset difference Sij = Si\Sj where node j is a descendant of the node i and Si is the
subtree rooted at the node i. If i = j , Sij is an empty set, hence, no key is assigned. Since
a unique key is assigned to every subset difference Sij , we will sometimes use Sij to refer
to the key assigned to Sij . The following strategy can be used to revoke r users [7].
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denotes the revoked user.
(2) Otherwise, pick two revoked users x1 and x2 such that their least common ancestor v
does not have any other revoked descendant.
(3) Let the child of v who is an ancestor of x1 be l. Let the child of v who is an ancestor
of x2 be r . Then, use the keys Sl,x1 and Sr,x2 . If l = x1, (or r = x2), Sl,x1 (or Sr,x2 ) is
empty, hence, no key is added.
(4) Remove all descendants of v and mark v to be revoked. Go back to (1).
Since at most two keys are selected at step (3) and the number of revoked nodes decreases
by one in every iteration, at most 2r − 1 keys will be used (hence, 2r − 1 encryptions) for
r revoked users. The simulation results of [7] suggest a tighter bound of 1.25r . We make
the following observations on the SD scheme. Let 1 ai  n, 0 bi  ai − 1.
1. Since the SD scheme is based on the binary tree structure, just as in the CST scheme,
the set of keys for N users is the union of two disjoint sets of keys, each of which is
for N/2 users. In addition, “new keys” are introduced as the number of users doubles
from N/2 to N . The new keys are the subset differences SO\St where O denotes the
root node and t denotes another node in a tree.
2. Valid cover sizes are 2ai − 2bi . There are exactly n(n+1)2 + 1 distinct cover sizes.
3. There are exactly 2n−bi keys of the cover size 2ai − 2bi .
4. Each user holds exactly 2ai−bi − 1 keys of the cover size 2ai − 2bi .
5. Let 2ai − 2bi < 2aj − 2bj  2n. For any key A of the cover size 2ai − 2bi , there exist
exactly 2aj−bj −  2ai −2bi
2bj
 keys B of the cover size 2aj − 2bj such that the key cover
of A is a proper subset of the key cover of each B .
2.3. The layered subset difference scheme (LSD)
The authors of [5] reduced key storage for the SD scheme by observing that Sij =
Sik ∪ Skj for nodes i, k and j on the same path [5]. A balanced binary tree of N leaf nodes
has log(N) + 1 levels, the root being at the level 0. Then, the LSD scheme designates
special levels b where b is a multiple of
√
logN = √n. For simplicity, we assume that n
is a perfect square. The set of levels between two consecutive special levels, including the
lower special level, is defined as a layer. The LSD scheme defines Sij to be useful if i is a
special level or i and j belong to the same layer. Clearly, any subset difference is a union of
two useful sets. Therefore, by remembering only the useful sets, the LSD scheme reduces
user storage significantly [5].
Since each subset difference can be expressed as a union of at most two useful sets, the
number of encryptions is at most twice the number of encryptions of the SD scheme in the
worst case. The simulation results of [5] suggest a tighter bound of 2r for r revoked users.
We make the following observations on the LSD scheme. Let 1  ai  n, 0  bi 
ai − 1.
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(1)√n | ai or
⌈
ai√
n
⌉
=
⌈
bi√
n
⌉
.
If the above conditions hold for ai and bi (and for aj and bj ), then, the following facts hold.
1. Just as in the case of the SD scheme, the set of keys for N users for the LSD scheme
is the union of two disjoint sets of keys, each of which is for N/2 users. In addition,
“new keys” are added into the system as the number of users doubles from N/2 to N .
The new keys are the set of “useful” subset difference SO\St .
2. There are n
√
n distinct cover sizes in total;
3. There are exactly 2n−bi keys of the cover size 2ai − 2bi ;
4. Each user holds exactly 2ai−bi − 1 keys of the cover size 2ai − 2bi ;
5. Let 2ai − 2bi < 2aj − 2bj  2n. For any key A of the cover size 2ai − 2bi , there exist
exactly 2aj−bj −  2ai −2bi
2bj
 keys B of the cover size 2aj − 2bj such that the key cover
of A is a proper subset of the key cover of each B .
6. If b is a special level and b+ 1 ai  b+√n, the smallest possible value for bi is b.
3. Recursive expressions for tree-based key distribution schemes
Let
(2)Gn(x, y) =
2n∑
j=0
j∑
i=0
a
(n)
ij x
iyj
denote a generating function for a key distribution scheme for N = 2n users where a(n)ij
denotes the number of subsets of j privileged users, which require exactly i encryptions.
We use the term (i, j)-privileged users to denote a set of j privileged users, which require
i encryptions. Note that the largest number of encryptions required for j users is at most
j . For a fixed j ,
∑j
i=0 aij =
(2n
j
)
since there are
(2n
j
)
subsets of j privileged users in the
system. Because the tree-based key distribution schemes use a complete binary tree as an
underlying structure, a given subset of privileged users can be partitioned into users in the
left subtree and users in the right subtree. In other words, the number of (i, j)-privileged
users in a system of 2n users can be expressed as the number of (i′, j ′)-privileged users in
the system of 2n−1 users.
We will denote by Tn(x, y), Sn(x, y) and Ln(x, y) the generating functions for the CST,
SD and LSD schemes respectively.
3.1. The generating function for the CST scheme
Theorem 1. The generating function for the CST scheme is
T0(x, y) = 1 + xy,
Tn(x, y) = Tn−1(x, y)2 + (1 − x)xy2n for n 1.
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needs no encryption and the single user needs one encryption. For n  1, consider (i, j)
privileged users. Then, this set can be partitioned into j ′ users, who belong to the left
subtree and j − j ′ users, who belong to the right subtree. The number of encryptions i
equals the summation of the number of encryptions for j ′ users in the left subtree and
that for j − j ′ users in the right subtree. Therefore, the number of (i, j)-privileged users,
a
(n)
ij =
∑j
j ′=0
∑i
i′=0 a
(n−1)
i′,j ′ a
(n−1)
i−i′,j−j ′ . The only exception occurs when j = 2n: this excep-
tion occurs because there is a new key for all the users in the system of 2n users, which
does not exist in the system of 2n−1 users. Hence,
Tn(x, y) =
2n∑
j=0
j∑
i=0
a
(n)
ij x
iyj
=
( 2n−1∑
j1=0
j1∑
i1=0
a
(n−1)
i1,j1
xi1yj1
)( 2n−1∑
j2=0
j2∑
i2=0
a
(n−1)
i2,j2
xi2yj2
)
+ xy2n(1 − x)
= Tn−1(x, y)2 + (1 − x)xy2n . 
Note that as the total number of users doubles, the CST scheme introduces one new key
to the set of keys as noted by the first observation on page 217. This new key is the key
assigned to the privileged set of all users in the system. The recursive expression consists
of two terms: the quadratic term, Tn−1(x, y)2 and the correction term, xy2
n
(1 − x). The
latter is necessary because of the new key, which is introduced as n is incremented.
3.2. The generating function for the SD scheme
Similar to the CST scheme, in the case of the SD and the LSD schemes, correction
terms are necessary due to the addition of new keys as the system size increases. Unlike
the CST scheme, which introduces only one new key as n increases, both the SD and the
LSD schemes add a number of new keys to the system as noted by the first observation
on page 218 and the second observation on page 219 respectively. Therefore, we expect
that the correction term for these schemes will be more complex. We are going to abuse
the notation Sij to denote the subset difference as well as the set of users who belong to
the subset difference Sij . In addition, |Sij | will be used to denote the number of users who
belong to the subset difference Sij .
Let Sn(x, y) = ∑2nj=0∑ji=0 a(n)ij xiyj be the generating function of the SD scheme.
Then,
Theorem 2. The generating function for the SD scheme is
S0(x, y) = 1 + xy,
Sn(x, y) = Sn−1(x, y)2 +Dn−1(x, y) for n 1,
where
D0(x, y) = (1 − x)xy2,
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[
y2
n + 2ny2n
n−2∑
i=0
2−iy−(2i )
]
for 2 n 3, and
Dn−1(x, y) = (1 − x)xy2n
[
1 + 2n
1∑
i=0
2−iy−(2i )
+ 2n−1
n−3∑
i=1
2−iy−(2i+1)
(
Si(x, y)− xy2i
)2]
for n 4.
Before proving Theorem 2, we would like to analyze the subset of privileged users that
are covered with “old” keys in the SD scheme.
Lemma 3. Consider a SD key distribution scheme with total 2m users. Let O denote the
root node and SO denote the entire tree. Then, (Sm−1(x, y) − xy2m−1)2 =∑j ∑i bij xiyj
where bij is the number of subsets of (i, j)-privileged users, who do not include any subset
differences SO\St where O denotes the root node and t denotes some node in the tree.
Proof. Note that SO\St denotes a new key, which does not exist in the system of 2m−1
users. Therefore, the lemma identifies the sets of privileged users, which do not use the new
keys. Note that |SO\St | = 2m−2i where |SO | = 2m and |St | = 2i . Hence, |SO\St | 2m−1.
In other words, any privileged user sets which include a subset difference SO\St must
include one of the two half subtrees. On the other hand, any privileged groups who include
the half subtree include a subset difference SO\St for some t . Since the term, xy2m−1 refers
to the half subtree, (Sm−1(x, y)− xy2m−1)2 describes the user sets who do not include any
subset difference SO\St : the user subsets which do not use any new keys. 
Proof for Theorem 2. Recall that instead of assigning a key to every node in the tree,
the SD scheme assigns a key to every subset difference Sij = Si\Sj where Si denote the
subtree rooted at node i. Since every balanced binary tree has 2k leaf nodes for some
integer k, each subset difference has 2k − 2l users. The proof is analogous to the proof
of Theorem 1 except for the following three cases, which require special attention. Let J
denote the privileged subset.
(1) J = SO : Analogous to the case of the CST scheme, the SD scheme requires only one
encryption while the Sn−1(x, y)2 predicts two encryptions. Hence, we need a correc-
tion term, (1 − x)xy2n .
(2) J = SO\St where St is a single user or a subtree with two users: The term, Sn−1(x, y)2
predicts two encryptions for J : one encryption for 2n−1 users, the other for 2n−1 − 2i
where i ∈ {0,1}. But since there is a key assigned for the subset difference SO\St ,
one encryption is sufficient. Hence, we need the correction term, xy2n−2i (1 − x). Note
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correction term in its final form is (1 − x)xy2n∑1i=0 2n−iy−2i .
(3) J = (SO\St ) ∪ z where St is a subtree with four or more users: Note that the user set
z must necessarily be a subset of users in St including the empty set. In addition, in
order to consider only distinct sets of J , z must not include a subset difference St\Sv
for some node v.
Let |St | = 2i and Sh denote the half subtree to which St belongs. Suppose that the
user set z requires k encryptions. Then, while k + 1 encryptions are sufficient, the
term Sn−1(x, y)2 predicts k + 2 encryptions for J : one encryption for SO\Sh, one
encryption for Sh\St and k encryptions for z.
Therefore the correction term is (1 − x)xk+1y2n−2i+|z|. Now we need to count the
number of such privileged sets. First, consider the set |SO\St |. There are 2n−i such
sets. Then, recall that z must be a subset of St , which does not include any subset
difference St\Sv . Let ak,|z| denote the set of all (k, |z|)-privileged users in St . Then,
the correction term in its final form is
(1 − x)
n−2∑
i=2
∑
z
2n−ixy2n−2i a(i)k,|z|x
ky|z|
= (1 − x)
n−2∑
i=2
2n−ixy2n−2i
∑
z
a
(i)
k,|z|x
ky|z|
= (1 − x)
n−2∑
i=2
2n−ixy2n−2i
(
Si−1(x, y)− xy2i−1
)2
= (1 − x)xy2n2n−1
n−3∑
i=1
2−iy−(2i+1)
(
Si(x, y)− xy2i
)2
. 
3.3. The generating function for the LSD scheme
Note that for both the CST scheme and the SD scheme, as the total number of users in
the system grows, new keys are added into the system while the original keys still remain
as a valid subset of keys. On the other hand, this property does not hold in the LSD scheme.
As n increases, the special levels, k
√
n, in the system change, hence, the original keys may
no longer be a valid subset of keys in a larger system. Therefore, in order to derive the
generating function recursively, the special levels need to be fixed.
Let Ln(x, y) denote the generating function for the LSD scheme. Then, the recursive
expression for the LSD scheme uses an auxiliary generating function Hnq (x, y), which de-
scribes the number of encryptions necessary for different subsets of users when there are
2q users in the system and special levels are defined as q − k√n where k = 0,1,2, . . . ,
	q/√n
. In other words, the Hnq (x, y) corresponds to the generating function with prede-
termined special levels regardless of the actual number of users in the system. Note that the
original LSD scheme always designates the level 0 (the top level) as a special level while
we always designate the bottom level (q) as a special level, for the expression for Hnq . This
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in which case the bottom level as well as the top level is a special level. For simplicity, we
assume that
√
n is an integer. For small values of
√
n, it is easy to obtain the generation
function Ln(x, y) by brute force. Therefore, we assume that
√
n 4.
Theorem 4. The generating function for the LSD scheme is
(3)Ln(x, y) = Hnn (x, y),
where
(1) If 0 q √n, Hnq (x, y) = Sq(x, y) where Sq(x, y) is the generating function for the
SD scheme for 2q users.
(2) If q = k√n for some integer k,
Hnq (x, y) = Hnq−1(x, y)2 + (1 − x)xy2
q
+ (1 − x)xy2q 2q
q−2∑
i=q−√n
2−iy−(2i )
(
Hni−1(x, y)− xy2
i−1)2
+ (1 − x2)xy2q 2q
q−√n−1∑
i=2
2−iy−(2i )
(
Hni−1(x, y)− xy2
i−1)2
+ (1 − x2)xy2q 2q
1∑
i=0
2−iy−(2i ).
(3) If q = 1 + k√n for some integer k,
Hnq (x, y) = Hnq−1(x, y)2 + (1 − x)xy2
q
.
(4) If q = 2 + k√n for some integer k,
Hnq (x, y) = Hnq−1(x, y)2 + (1 − x)xy2
q
+ 4(1 − x)xy2q−2q−2(Hnq−2(x, y)− xy2q−2).
(5) For all other cases,
Hnq (x, y) = Hnq−1(x, y)2 + (1 − x)xy2
q
+ (1 − x)xy2q 2q
q−2∑
i=s(q)+1
2−iy−(2i )
(
Hni−1(x, y)− xy2
i−1)2
+ (1 − x)xy2q−2s(q)2q−s(q)(Hns(q)(x, y)− xy2s(q)),
where s(q) = 	q/√n
√n refers to the highest special level in a balanced subtree for
2q users.
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k
√
n for k ∈ {1,2, . . . ,√n}, which equals Ln(x, y).
(1) For 0 q √n: All levels belong to the same layer, hence, all subset differences are
useful sets.
(2) For q = k√n for some integer k: In this case, the top level is a special level. Two types
of new keys are added: first, one key for all users; second, keys corresponding to the
subset difference SO\St for all nodes t at level l, 2 l  q .
Consider the subset difference SO\St . If the node t is at the level l, 2 l √n, while
one encryption is sufficient, the recursive quadratic term, Hnq−1(x, y)2 predicts two
encryptions for SO\St : one for Sh1\St and the other for SO\Sh1 where Sh1 denotes the
half subtree to which St belongs to.
On the other hand, if the node t is at the level l,
√
n+ 1 l  q , Hnq−1(x, y)2 predicts
three encryptions for SO\St : one for Sh1\Sq ′ , another for Sq ′ \St , the last for SO\Sh1
where h1 is the half subtree St belongs to, and Sq ′ is the subtree rooted at the level√
n to which St belongs to. In other words, since the node t and any of the children
of the root node O do not belong to the same layer, it predicts three encryptions while
two encryptions are sufficient. Therefore, unlike the above case, the correction term
requires (1 − x2) instead of (1 − x). The rest of the derivation is analogous to the SD
scheme.
(3) For q = 1 + k√n for some integer k: The only new key is the key for all users. There-
fore, this case is analogous to the CST scheme.
(4) For q = 2 + k√n for some integer k: There are five new keys: one key is assigned
to all users in the system and each of four keys is assigned to the subset difference
SO\St where t is a node on level 2. Clearly, the first correction term, (1 − x)xy2q
corresponds to the correction required by the first new key. The second correction
term, 4(1 − x)xy2q−2q−2(Hnq−2(x, y) − xy2
q−2
) is required by the last four keys. Any
privileged user set SO\St ∪ z needs 1+ number of encryptions needed for z. The user
set z can be any proper subset of St . Note that unlike in the case of the SD scheme, z
may equal St\Sv because there is no new key assigned for the subset difference SO\Sv .
Since the union of all proper subsets of St is expressed as (Hnq−2(x, y) − xy2
q−2
), we
obtain the desired result.
(5) For all the other cases: Two new types of keys are added: first, one key corre-
sponding to all users; second, keys corresponding to the subset differences SO\St
for all nodes t at the level l, 2  l  q − s(q). Clearly, the first correction term,
(1 − x)xy2q , is required by the key corresponding to all users. The second correc-
tion term, (1 − x)xy2q 2q∑q−2i=s(q)+1 2−iy−(2i )(Hni−1(x, y) − xy2i−1)2 is required by
the keys corresponding to SO\St for all nodes t at the level l, 2 l  q − (s(q) + 1).
The third correction term, (1 − x)xy2q−2s(q)2q−s(q)(Hns(q)(x, y) − xy2
s(q)
) is required
by the keys corresponding to SO\St ′ where t ′ is a node at the level q − s(q). Note
that if a privileged set consists of SO\St ′ and any proper subset of St ′ , the number of
encryptions equals 1+ (the number of encryptions required for the proper subset of
St ′ ). Since the latter is (Hns(q)(x, y)− xy2
s(q)
), we obtain the desired result. 
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The recursions in the previous section are doubly exponential in the sense that they in-
volve expressions of the form (G(x, y))2n . The original intent was to derive three variable
generating functions of the form, G(x, y, z) =∑n0 Gn(x, y)zn but this proved beyond
our means. Such a function would have provided interesting asymptotic information. Nev-
ertheless, we use the generating functions to derive the exact expressions for the mean
number of encryptions which was previously only conjectured.
We assume that each of the 2N possible privileged sets has the same probability. In the
absence of any other information, this would seem a natural assumption. Therefore, using
the notations of Section 3, for n 0,
(4)m(n) =
∑
j
∑
i ia
(n)
ij
2N
= 1
2N
dGn(x, y)
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=y=1
where Gn(x, y) is the appropriate generating function, we obtain the following results.
Theorem 5. The mean number of encryptions over all privileged sets for the CST scheme
is given by
mCST(n) = N2 −
(
n−1∑
k=0
2k−
N
2k
)
, n 1,
with mCST(0) = 0.5.
Proof. Straightforward application of Eq. (4) with Gn(x, y) = Tn(x, y), n  0 where
Tn(x, y) is as defined in Theorem 1. 
Theorem 6. The mean number of encryptions over all privileged sets for the SD scheme is
given by
mSD(n) = 595N2048 − 13
(
n−4∑
i=0
2i−
N
2i
)
−
(
n−4∑
i=0
N2−(N/2i )
n−3−i∑
k=1
22
k−k
)
, n 4,
with mSD(0) = 0.5,mSD(1) = 0.75,mSD(2) = 1.1875 and mSD(3) = 2.324.
Proof. Straightforward application of Eq. (4) with Gn(x, y) = Sn(x, y), n  0 where
Sn(x, y) is as defined in Theorem 2. 
Theorem 7. The mean number of encryptions over all privileged sets for the LSD scheme
is given by
mLSD(n) = N2√nmSD
(√
n
)+
√
n−2∑
i=0
2
√
niC√n−i , n 16,
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√
n ) is the mean number of encryptions over all privileged sets for the SD
scheme with 2
√
n users and A = 2√n and
Ck = −22Ak−1−1A− 2−3Ak−1A+ 3
(
2−4Ak−1−2A
)−
√
n−3∑
i=1
2−
Ak
2i
+i
−
√
n−3∑
i=0
2−Ak2−iAk
k
√
n−2−i∑
j=(k−1)√n+1
2−j
(
22
j − 22j−1+1 + 1)
−A2−Ak (2Ak−1 − 2Ak−12 +1 + 1)−
√
n−3∑
i=1
2−Ak/2iA
(
2A
k−1 − 1)
− 2Ak2−Ak
(k−1)√n−1∑
j=2
2−j
(
22
j − 22j−1+1 + 1)− 2−Ak − 3(Ak2−Ak ).
Proof. Let
mnq =
1
2q
d
dx
Hnq (x, y)
∣∣∣∣
x=y=1
where Hnq is as defined in Theorem 4. Clearly, by the first case of Theorem 4,
mn√
n
= mSD
(√
n
)
.
Since, the generating function for the LSD scheme is recursively derived in Theorem 4,
mn
k
√
n
can be recursively expressed in terms of mn
k
√
n−1,m
n
k
√
n−2, . . . ,m
n
(k−1)√n for k  2.
Solving the recursion, we obtain
mn
k
√
n
= Amn
(k−1)√n − 2−2A
k−1−1A− 2−4Ak−1+Ak−1A+ 3(2−4Ak−1−2A)
−
√
n−3∑
i=1
2−Ak2−i+i −
√
n−3∑
i=0
2−Ak2−iAk
k
√
n−2−i∑
j=(k−1)√n+1
2−j
(
22
j − 22j−1+1 + 1)
−A2−Ak (2Ak−1 − 2Ak−1·2−1+1 + 1)−
√
n−3∑
i=1
2−Ak2−iA
(
2A
k−1 − 1)
− 2Ak2−Ak
(k−1)√n−1∑
j=2
2−j
(
22
j − 22j−1+1 + 1)− 2−Ak − 3(Ak2−Ak ).
We solve the above recursion for k = √n and obtain the desired result by noting that
mLSD(n) = mnn. 
Fig. 1 shows the mean number of encryptions over all privileged user sets as N in-
creases. Note that the mean number of encryptions for SD and for LSD are almost equal.
This will be explained in Section 5.4.
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5. The mean number of encryptions for J privileged users
In this section, we derive the mean number of encryptions for a collection of privileged
users of a fixed size J . This is useful in applications in which the number of privileged
users can be estimated a priori. Assuming that each set of J users from N users is equally
likely, the mean number of encryptions for J privileged users is given by
1(
N
J
) 1
J !
d
dx
dJ
dyJ
Gn(x, y)
∣∣∣∣
x=1,y=0
for a given generating function Gn(x, y). Due to the quadratic nature of the underlying
recursion, the above equation leads to awkward and complex computations [2]. Hence, we
obtain the desired quantity by a different method.
Suppose that a key of the cover size m is used in the encryption. Then, the number of
encryptions for each user in the key cover of this particular key equals 1
m
. Since the tree-
based key distribution schemes distribute keys identically amongst all users and that each
key is used to cover a disjoint subset of privileged users, the mean number of encryptions
for J privileged users equals J times the mean number of encryptions for single privileged
users. Without loss of generality, we assume that the user 1, u1, is in the privileged set T .
We use the following notation;
• Let Au,m denote the set of keys of the cover size m held by the user u.
• Let Pm denote the conditional probability that users {u1, u2, . . . , um} ⊆ T given u1 ∈
T . Hence,
(5)Pm =
(
N −m)/(N − 1)
.
J −m J − 1
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given u1 ∈ T .
• Let Pem denote the conditional probability that 1/m encryption is for user u1. Hence,
(6)Pem = P(m) × |Au1,m|.
• Let ks denote the key with the key cover s. If V = {u1, u2, . . . , um} ⊆ T and there
exists the key kV , the key kV will be used for encryption unless there exists a key kW ,
such that V ⊆ W ⊆ T . Therefore,
(7)P(m) = Pm −
∑
i>m
ciP(i),
where ci is the number of keys whose key cover include V and have the cover size i.
• The mean number of encryptions for single privileged user equals
(8)
∑
m
1
m
Pem
where m is a valid cover size.
5.1. The exact mean number of encryptions for the CST scheme
By the second observation on page 217, key cover m is valid if and only if m = 2i ,
0  i  n and by the fourth observation on the same page, |Au1,m| = 1. Hence, by these
observations and (7),
P(m) = Pm −
∑
i>m
P(i).
Therefore,
P(m) = Pem = Pm − P2m.
Consequently, given N and J , the mean number of encryptions for single privileged user
equals
	logJ 
∑
k=0
1
2k
Pe2k =
	logJ 
∑
k=0
1
2k
(P2k − P2k+1).
The exact mean number of encryptions for J privileged users equals J times the above
quantity. Thus, by (5),
Theorem 8. The mean number of encryptions for J privileged users in the CST scheme is
given by
mCST(J ) =
	logJ 
∑
k=0
J
2k
((
N−2k
J−2k
)− (N−2k+1
J−2k+1
)
(
N−1
J−1
)
)
.
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By the second observation on page 218, the valid cover sizes are 2a − 2b , where
1  a  n and 0  b  a − 1. Also, the fourth observation on the same page noted that
|Au1,2a−2b | = 2a−b − 1. By these observations and (6), the mean number of encryptions
for single privileged user equals
∑
m
1
m
Pem =
∑
m=2a−2b
1
2a − 2b Pe2a−2b =
∑
m=2a−2b
2a−b − 1
2a − 2b P(2a−2b)
=
∑
m=2a−2b
1
2b
P(m),
where 0 b 	logJ 
 − 1 and b + 1 a  	logJ 
. Let P(b) =∑	logJ 
a=b+1 P(2a−2b). Then,
the mean number of encryptions for single privileged user equals
m
single
SD (n) =
	logJ 
−1∑
b=0
1
2b
P (b).
Lemma 9.
P(0) = P1 − P2,
P (b) = P2b + P2b+1 − 2P2b+2b−1 for 1 b 	logJ 
 − 1.
Proof. By (7) and note 5 in Section 2.2,
P1 = P(1) + P(2) +
∑
i>2
(
2ai−bi −
⌈
1
2bi
⌉)
P(i),
P2 = P(2) +
∑
i>2
(
2ai−bi −
⌈
2
2bi
⌉)
P(i).
Hence,
P1 − P2 = P(1) +
∑
j>2,j=2a−1
P(j).
Thus,
P1 − P2 = P(0).
Let i = 2ai − 2bi > 2b, i = 2b + 2b−1, i = 2b+1. Then,
P2b = P(2b) + 2P(2b+2b−1) + P(2b+1) +
∑(
2ai−bi −
⌈
2b
2bi
⌉)
P(i).i
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P2b+2b−1 = P(2b+2b−1) + P(2b+1) +
∑
j
(
2aj−bj −
⌈
2b + 2b−1
2bj
⌉)
P(j).
Let k = 2ak − 2bk > 2b+1. Then,
P2b+1 = P(2b+1) +
∑
k
(
2ak−bk −
⌈
2b+1
2bk
⌉)
P(k).
Then, it is easy to verify that
P2b + P2b+1 − 2P2b+2b−1 =
∑
ab+1
P(2a−2b) = P(b). 
Therefore, if there are J privileged users, the mean number of encryptions per single
privileged user in the SD scheme equals
m
single
SD (J ) = (P1 − P2)+
	logJ 
∑
b=1
1
2b
(P2b + P2b+1 − 2P2b+2b−1).
Since the mean number of encryptions for J privileged users equals J times the above
quantity, by (5),
Theorem 10. The mean number of encryptions for J privileged users in the SD scheme is
given by
mSD(J ) = J
((
N−1
J−1
)− (N−2
J−2
)
(
N−1
J−1
)
)
+
	logJ 
∑
b=1
J
2b
((
N−2b
J−2b
)+ (N−2b+1
J−2b+1
)− 2(N−2b−2b−1
J−2b−2b−1
)
(
N−1
J−1
)
)
.
5.3. The exact mean number of encryptions for the LSD scheme
For cases
√
n 2, the mean number of encryptions for J privileged users can be derived
trivially by brute force. Therefore, we assume that
√
n 3. For simplicity, we assume that√
n is an integer.
Recall from Section 2.3 that only the useful subsets are stored in the LSD scheme. This
implies that all keys of the cover size 2ai − 2bi in the LSD scheme satisfy the condition
(1) in Section 2.3. Otherwise, the relationship between Pi and P(j) with j  i remains the
same as in the case of the SD scheme as noted by the sixth observation on page 218. Hence,
the mean number of encryptions for the LSD scheme can be derived in the same way as
that for the SD scheme. Since for the SD scheme, P(b) = P2b + P2b+1 − 2P2b+2b−1 , the
same applies to the LSD scheme as long as there exist keys of the cover sizes 2b, 2b+1 and
2b + 2b−1. In addition, keys of a cover size 2i , 0 i  n, always exist in the LSD scheme
because either the level i + 1 and the level i must belong to the same layer or i + 1 is a
special level. Therefore, the only difference from the SD scheme is when a key cover of
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2b + 2b−1 = 2b+1 − 2b−1
if a key cover of 2b + 2b−1 does not exist, it implies that b+ 1 is not a special level and the
level b + 1 and b − 1 do not belong to the same layer. In addition, since we assume that√
n 3, this case occurs only when b is a special level.
Lemma 11. Let
√
n | b and
P(b) =
∑
k
P(k) where k = 2a − 2b, b < a  n.
Then,
P(b) = P2b − P2b+1 − 2(P2b+√n−2b−1 − P2b+√n).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 9.
Let i = 2ai − 2bi > 2b and i = 2b+1, i = 2b+√n − 2b−1, i = 2b+√n. Then,
P2b = P(2b) + P(2b+1) + (2
√
n+1 − 2)P
(2b+
√
n−2b−1)
+ P
(2b+
√
n)
+
∑
i
(
2ai−bi −
⌈
2b
2bi
⌉)
P(i).
Let j = 2aj − 2bj > 2b+1 and j = 2b+√n − 2b−1, j = 2b+√n. Then,
P2b+1 = P(2b+1) + (2
√
n+1 − 4)P
(2b+
√
n−2b−1) + P(2b+√n)
+
∑
j
(
2aj−bj −
⌈
2b+1
2bj
⌉)
P(j).
Let k = 2ak − 2bk > 2b+√n − 2b−1 and k = 2b+√n. Then,
P2b+
√
n−2b−1 = P(2b+√n−2b−1) + P(2b+√n) +
∑
k
(
2ak−bk −
⌈
2b+
√
n − 2b−1
2bk
⌉)
P(k).
Let l = 2al − 2bl > 2b+√n. Then,
P2b+
√
n = P(2b+√n) +
∑
l
(
2al−bl −
⌈
2b+
√
n − 2b−1
2bl
⌉)
P(l).
Then, it is easy to verify that,
P2b − P2b+1 − 2(P2b+√n−2b−1 − P2b+√n) =
∑
ab+1
P(2a−2b) = P(b). 
Thus, if there are J privileged users, the mean number of encryptions for a single priv-
ileged user equals
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single
LSD (J ) = (P1 − P2)+
∑
√
n|b
1
2b
(
P2b − P2b+1 − 2(P2b+√n−2b−1 − P2b+√n)
)
+
∑
√
nb
(P2b + P2b+1 − 2P2b+2b−1),
where 1 b 	logJ 
.
The mean number of encryptions for J privileged users equals J times the above quan-
tity. Hence, by (5),
Theorem 12. The mean number of encryptions for J privileged users in the LSD scheme
is given by
mLSD(J ) = J
((
N−1
J−1
)− (N−2
J−2
)
(
N−1
J−1
)
)
+
∑
√
n|b
J
2b
((
N−2b
J−2b
)− (N−2b+1
J−2b+1
)− 2(N−2b+√n+2b−1
J−2b+√n+2b−1
)+ 2(N−2b+√n
J−2b+√n
)
(
N−1
J−1
)
)
+
∑
√
nb
J
2b
((
N−2b
J−2b
)+ (N−2b+1
J−2b+1
)− 2(N−2b−2b−1
J−2b−2b−1
)
(
N−1
J−1
)
)
,
where 1 b 	logJ 
.
Fig. 2. The exact mean number of encryptions for R = 15/16.
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5.4. Comparisons between tree-based key distribution schemes
Let R = J/N denote the ratio of the number of privileged users to the number of all
users. We compare the mean of tree-based key distribution schemes. Fig. 2 shows the exact
mean number of encryptions for R = 15/16. Clearly, for a fixed R, the mean number of
encryptions for each scheme increases almost linearly with N . As expected, the SD scheme
results in the least number of encryptions while the CST scheme in the largest.
Fig. 3 shows the exact mean number of encryptions for various values of J when the
total number of users is fixed as N = 512. Note that for J < N/2, the mean number of
encryptions of the SD scheme is almost the same as the mean number of encryptions for
the LSD scheme. Only when the number of privileged users is larger than half of the
users, the SD scheme results in a smaller number of encryptions. This explains why the
mean number of encryptions of the SD and of the LSD scheme are almost equal over all
privileged subsets of users shown in Fig. 1.
6. Approximations
Previous exact expressions are complex to compute and difficult to gain insight from.
It is therefore worthwhile to explore approximations and this problem is considered in this
section.
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Note that for sufficiently small k,
(9)1
2k
(
N−2k
J−2k
)
(
N−1
J−1
) ≈ 12k
(
J
N
)2k−1
= 1
2k
R2
k−1.
Also, for large k, the above is negligibly small. Hence, the mean is approximated by sum-
ming over small values of k using (9). Since approximations for the other two schemes are
analogous to that for the CST scheme, we omit the derivations and present only the results
for the later two schemes.
6.1. Approximation for the CST scheme
The mean number of encryptions for single user in the CST scheme equals
	logJ 
∑
b=0
1
2b
(
N−2b
J−2b
)− (N−2b+1
J−2b+1
)
(
N−1
J−1
) .
Hence, using (9), each term in the summation is approximated as
1
2b
(R2
b−1 −R2b+1−1).
It is easy to verify that for b > 1 − log log |R|, the above term is negligible. As the number
of terms in the summation increases, the approximation approaches closer to the exact
value. Consequently, the mean number of encryptions for J privileged users in the CST
scheme approximately equals
RN
{
1 −R +
k∑
b=1
1
2b
(
R2
b−1 −R2b+1−1)
}
,
where the exact value for k ≈ 1 − log | logR| depends on the desired accuracy. Note that
for a fixed R, the above expression increases linearly with N , which explains the linear
behavior shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 4 compares the exact mean number of encryptions, the approximations in [7] and
our approximations where k is set to 	4 − log | logR|
. Our approximation is very close to
the exact value and appears to coincide with the exact number of encryptions in the figure.
Table 1 shows numerical comparisons.
6.2. Approximation for the SD scheme
The mean number of encryptions for J users in the SD scheme equals approximately
RN
(
1 −R +R−1
k∑
b=1
1
2b
(
R2
b−1
(R2
b−1 − 1))2
)
.
The exact value for k ≈ 2 − log | logR| depends on the desired accuracy.
E.C. Park, I.F. Blake / Journal of Discrete Algorithms 4 (2006) 215–238 235Fig. 4. Comparison of approximations for the CST scheme.
Table 1
Numerical comparison of the mean number of encryptions for J privileged
users in the CST scheme
N [7] Exact Approximation
128 32 26.69139481 26.09509266
1024 256 209.3520486 208.7607413
8192 2048 1670.675820 1670.085930
32768 8192 6680.933468 6680.343721
65536 16384 13361.27718 13360.68744
Fig. 5 compares the exact mean number of encryptions for the SD scheme with the
approximation from [7] and our approximation where k is set to 	4 − log | logR|
. Again,
our approximation is very close to the exact value as shown. Table 2 shows numerical
comparisons.
6.3. Approximation for the LSD scheme
The mean number of encryptions for J privileged users in the LSD scheme equals
approximately
RN
{
1 −R +
∑
√
nb
1
2b
(
R2
b−1 +R2b+1−1 − 2R2b+2b−1−1)
+
∑
√
1
2b
(
R2
b−1 −R2b+1−1 − 2R2b+
√
n−2b−1−1 + 2R2b+
√
n−1)},n|b
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Table 2
Numerical comparison of the mean number of encryptions for J privileged
users in the SD scheme
N [7] Exact Approximation
128 10 9.355929804 9.274782379
1024 80 74.27811426 74.19825903
8192 640 593.6658545 593.5860723
32768 2560 2374.424071 2374.344289
65536 5120 4748.768368 4748.688578
where the exact number of terms in the summation depends on the desired accuracy of the
approximation.
Fig. 6 compares the exact mean number of encryptions for the LSD scheme with
the approximation from [5] and our approximation. The largest value of b is set to
	4 − log | logR|
. Once again, our approximation is very close to the exact value. Table 3
shows numerical comparisons.
7. Conclusion
The generating functions for the tree-based key distribution schemes have been intro-
duced to investigate the exact mean number of encryptions. These generating functions
describe the number of encryptions required for every subset of users in the system and are
derived recursively. The recursions introduced in this paper are known to be doubly expo-
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Table 3
Numerical comparison of the mean number of encryptions for J privileged
users in the LSD scheme
N [5] Exact Approximation
512 64 50.29836283 49.94586355
65536 8192 5450.756030 5450.640876
nential and difficult to work with. Nevertheless, we showed that the generating functions
can be used to obtain the exact mean number of encryptions over all privileged users. In
addition, we quantified exactly the mean number of encryptions for a fixed number of priv-
ileged users and also derived approximations. Our approximations were shown to be very
close to the exact value and significantly more accurate than previously known estimations.
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